Decision making on the sole basis of statistical likelihood  by Giang, Phan H. & Shenoy, Prakash P.
Artificial Intelligence 165 (2005) 137–163
www.elsevier.com/locate/artint
Decision making on the sole basis of
statistical likelihood
Phan H. Giang a,∗, Prakash P. Shenoy b
a Computer Aided Diagnosis and Therapy Solutions (CAD), Siemens Medical Solutions,
51 Valley Stream Pkwy, Malvern, PA 19355, USA
b University of Kansas School of Business, 1300 Sunnyside Ave, Summerfield Hall,
Lawrence, KS 66045-7585, USA
Received 10 May 2004; accepted 16 March 2005
Available online 10 May 2005
Abstract
This paper presents a new axiomatic decision theory for choice under uncertainty. Unlike Bayesian
decision theory where uncertainty is represented by a probability function, in our theory, uncertainty
is given in the form of a likelihood function extracted from statistical evidence. The likelihood prin-
ciple in statistics stipulates that likelihood functions encode all relevant information obtainable from
experimental data. In particular, we do not assume any knowledge of prior probabilities. Conse-
quently, a Bayesian conversion of likelihoods to posterior probabilities is not possible in our setting.
We make an assumption that defines the likelihood of a set of hypotheses as the maximum likelihood
over the elements of the set. We justify an axiomatic system similar to that used by von Neumann
and Morgenstern for choice under risk. Our main result is a representation theorem using the new
concept of binary utility. We also discuss how ambiguity attitudes are handled. Applied to the sta-
tistical inference problem, our theory suggests a novel solution. The results in this paper could be
useful for probabilistic model selection.
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Various formal decision theories for choice under risk and uncertainty have been studied
since the seminal work by von Neumann and Morgenstern (vNM) [38] where the expected
utility maximization principle was formally established. With few exceptions, a common
feature in these theories is the use of probability to express uncertainty in decision situ-
ations. An axiomatic model is as good as its axioms, the debate on axioms of the vNM
theory started almost immediately with their publication [2]. As a result of this ongoing
debate, axiomatic systems that are weaker than vNM but still possess the expected utility
representation have been investigated [17,32,33]. There is also a recognition that the uncer-
tainty that one usually associates with the words “ambiguity”, “vagueness” and “fuzziness”
are not the same kind as that associated with “risk”. The latter is captured by standard nu-
merical probability.
In this paper,1 we consider a class of choice problems where uncertainty is character-
ized by likelihood functions. This class includes a typical statistical inference problem that
is formulated as follows. Suppose we are to analyze a statistical experiment on a random
variable Y given (i) Y follows one of the distributions in F = {Pθ | θ ∈ Ω} parameter-
ized by θ ; and (ii) the outcome of the experiment is Y = y. The question is: what can we
conclude about the true value of parameter θ?
There is consensus among statisticians about what information sample y brings to the
unknown parameter. According to the likelihood principle, one of the fundamental princi-
ples of statistics [4,5,8], all relevant information of the sample is encoded in the likelihood
function on the parameter space. And the consensus also ends at this point. The statistical
inference problem is treated differently by different approaches [3].
According to the decision-theoretic approach advocated by Wald [39], the inference
problem is viewed as a choice problem. For example, in the context of a hypothesis testing
problem, the choice is to either accept or reject a hypothesis. Within the decision-theoretic
approach there are several variations. Wald’s maximin decision rule selects an action that
delivers the most favorable worst-case outcome. A Bayesian treatment of the problem sug-
gests a calculation of posterior probability function on Ω via Bayes’s theorem from the
likelihood function by assuming a prior distribution. Given the posteriors, actions are com-
pared on the basis of their expected utility. In this paper, we proposes a third alternative.
We construct a decision theory that works directly with likelihood information. We choose
to treat likelihood as uncertainty in its own right for a simple reason: priors are not known
in many situations.
The problem of probabilistic model selection in the areas of AI, machine learning, pat-
tern recognition and data mining is an example of the statistical inference problem. Given
a (training) data set y, researchers construct a probabilistic model P (e.g., a Bayesian net)
that generates/fits the data and then use this model for inference with future observations.
Because there are, almost always, more than one models that emerge as plausible candi-
dates, model selection is an essential part of model construction.
1 A preliminary version of this work has appeared in the Proceedings of 18th Conference on Uncertainty in
Artificial Intelligence (UAI 2002) [21].
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simple criteria such as maximum likelihood (ML) or maximum a posteriori probability
(MAP) is equivalent to assuming equal utilities (costs) for all models under consideration.
This assumption however does not explain the following example. Given two models of
approximately the same likelihoods, most researchers would go for a simpler one (and jus-
tify this choice by invoking Occam’s razor principle). In the statistics literature, models
are selected by using Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) [1] or Schwarz’s criterion (a.k.a.
Bayesian Information Criterion or BIC) [34]. The idea underlying both AIC and BIC is to
penalize model’s likelihood by an amount depending on its number of parameters. Poland
and Shachter [31] suggest the “effectiveness ratio” criterion where the penalty has an ex-
plicit computational interpretation. Clearly, the concern on complexity can be viewed as
a cost associated with a model. In broader terms, an implication from these works is that
different models are associated with different costs that must be taken into account in a
model selection process.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss extending a likelihood
function to a function on the set of subsets of possible worlds. In the main part (Section 3),
we develop a decision theory for likelihood uncertainty. We begin by proposing a set of five
axioms that are justified by intuition as well as by the stochastic dominance principle. Next,
we introduce the concept of binary utility and prove the representation theorem for likeli-
hood lotteries. That is followed by comments on related works. In Section 4, our decision
theory is applied for a statistical inference problem. Section 5 contains some concluding
remarks.
2. Likelihood as uncertainty measure
Let us consider the statistical inference problem as described earlier. Although the phe-
nomenon under study is described probabilistically (by a set of probability functions F ),
the uncertainty pertaining to the choice problem is not. It is a likelihood function. The term
‘likelihood’ used in modern statistics was coined by R.A. Fisher who mentioned it as early
as 1922 [18]. Fisher used likelihoods to measure “mental confidence” in competing sci-
entific hypotheses as a result of a statistical experiment (see [14] for a detailed account).
Likelihood has a puzzling nature. For each θ ∈ Ω , there is a likelihood quantity that by
magnitude equals Pθ(y)—the probability (or probability density in case of infinite Ω)2 of
observing y if θ is in fact the true value of the parameter. However, if we view the set of
likelihood quantities as a function on the parameter space, we have a likelihood function.
A likelihood function is not a probability function. For a simple reason, the sum of all
likelihood values (over the parameter space) may not add to unity. Moreover, likelihood
functions are equivalent up to a proportional constant.
To emphasize the fact that a likelihood function is tied to data y and has θ as the variable,
the notation liky(θ) is used instead of Pθ(y). Technically, probability and likelihood are
2 One can write Pθ0 (y) in the form of a conditional probability: P(Y = y | θ = θ0). The latter notation implies
that there is a probability measure on parameter space Ω . This is the case for the Bayesian approach. In this paper,
we do not assume such a probability measure. So we will stick with the former notation.
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reason for an intertwining relationship. Obviously, (posterior) probability is derived from
likelihood and priors via Bayes theorem. Since such priors are supposed to summarize the
information about the parameter before the experiment is conducted, the assumption of its
existence is beyond the realm of science as many statisticians contend. Although in certain
situations prior probability comes naturally, there is no compelling argument why it must
always be known to an experimenter in all situations.
Another path from likelihood to probability, that bypasses the issue of priors, was started
by Fisher himself. He suggested to compute what he called fiducial probabilities by nor-
malizing the likelihoods (dividing by the sum of likelihoods). Fisher’s idea has been shown
to work for isolated examples and but it faces a serious difficulty when applied to general
cases. Some statisticians now believe that the fiducial probability is a mistake [3].
Belief function theory was proposed by Dempster [9] in an attempt to overcome the
difficulty of the fiducial argument. Shafer [35] is mainly responsible for turning Dempster’s
idea into a full-fledged theory of evidence. A basic construct in Dempster–Shafer theory is
basic probability assignment (BPA)
m : 2Ω → [0,1] such that m(∅) = 0 and
∑
A⊆Ω
m(A) = 1 (1)
Value m(A) for A ⊆ Ω is called probability mass of A. If m(A) > 0 then A is called a
focus. A standard probability function is a belief function whose foci are singletons. From
a BPA, one can derive a plausibility function
Pl(A) def=
∑
B∩A=∅
m(B) for all ∅ = A ⊆ Ω (2)
BPA and plausibility have the same information content since the original m can be recov-
ered from Pl.
Shafer [35] proposes to represent statistical evidence by a belief function with nested
foci (consonant belief function or CBF) such that plausibilities on singletons are propor-
tional to the likelihood values. Given a likelihood function likx , the corresponding CBF
is constructed as follows. Suppose likx partitions Ω into {Ωi} according to its values
Ωi = {ω | likx(ω) = ai} with a1 > a2 > · · · > ak . Then there are k foci (Ai) and k masses
Ai =
i⋃
j=1
Ωi and m(Ai) = (ai − ai+1)
a1
(3)
where ak+1
def= 0.
A consequence of nested-focus structure is that plausibility function is union decom-
posable, i.e., for A,B ⊆ Ω
Pl(A∪B) = max(Pl(A),Pl(B)) (4)
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CBF is in agreement with the maximum likelihood method (ML) of statistics. In ML, the
likelihood assigned to a set of hypotheses is taken to be the maximum of the likelihoods
of individual hypothesis in the set. The idea of taking the maximum individual likelihood
as the likelihood for a set has been a standard practice since the publication of seminal
papers [30] by Neyman and Pearson (1928). ML is not only intuitively appealing, but it is
also backed by various asymptotic optimality properties [26,27].
We will use different notation than one in [35]. We want to emphasize the nature of
likelihood and avoid belief function connotations. While Shafer is mainly interested in
representing and reasoning with evidence, our goal is decision making. Let us define an
extended likelihood function or ELF Liky : 2Ω → [0,1] as follows.
Liky(θ)
def= liky(θ)
supω∈Ω liky(ω)
= liky(θ)
liky(θˆ )
for θ ∈ Ω (5)
where θˆ is the maximum likelihood estimate of θ .
Liky(A)
def= sup
ω∈A
Liky(ω) for A ⊆ Ω (6)
After learning that the true value of parameter is in a subset of the parameter space B ⊆ Ω
such that Liky(B) > 0, one should condition the ELF by the following equation.
Liky(A | B) def= Liky(A∩B)Liky(B) (7)
This definition of likelihood conditioning is derived from Dempster’s rule of combination
applied for a consonant belief function in plausibility form. It also conforms to the likeli-
hood principle as the following example demonstrates.
We use the convention Liky(∅) = 0. Some properties of Lik follow directly from its
definitions.
Lemma 1.
(i) Liky(Ω) = 1.
(ii) Liky(A∪B) = max{Liky(A),Liky(B)}.
(iii) max{Liky(A),Liky(A¯)} = 1 where A¯ is the complement of A in Ω .
(iv) If A ⊆ B then Liky(A) Liky(B).
Example. A r.v. Y is known to have a normal distribution. It is also known that mean
µ ∈ {0,1} and standard deviation σ ∈ {1,1.5}. Suppose that value y = 1.4 is observed. We
3 Shafer [36] later renounces his idea on the ground that the set of CBFs is not closed under Dempster’s rule of
combination, which is the standard rule to combine two distinct pieces of evidence. It implies that representation
of compound evidence is not the same as the combination of individual evidences. However, later Walley [40]
shows that Dempster’s rule is not compatible with the likelihood principle, and therefore is not suitable for
combining statistical evidence. He also shows that set of CBFs is closed under an alternative combination rule.
With respect to conditioning Dempster’s rule and Walley’s alternative are identical.
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Likelihood, extended likelihood and conditioning
ω1 ω2 ω3 ω4 A B C D
lik1.4(∗) 0.1497 0.1721 0.3683 0.2567 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Lik1.4(∗) 0.4065 0.4673 1.0000 0.6970 0.4673 1 1 0.6970
Lik1.4(∗ | D) 0.0000 0.6704 0.0000 1.0000 0.6704 1 0 1.0000
want to calculate the ELF representing uncertainty about unknown parameters. The un-
known parameter θ = (µ,σ ). Ω = {ω1,ω2,ω3,ω4} with ω1 = (0,1), ω2 = (0,1.5), ω3 =
(1,1), ω4 = (1,1.5). Let A denote event µ = 0, B denote µ = 1, C denote σ = 1 and D
denote σ = 1.5. That means A = {ω1,ω2}, B = {ω3,ω4}, C = {ω1,ω3} and D = {ω2,ω4}.
In the first row are densities at 1.4 of normal probability density function given a configu-
ration of mean µ and standard deviation σ : f (1.4 | µ,σ). For example, f (1.4 | µ = 0, σ =
1) = 0.1497. Obviously, density is not defined for a set of configurations (A,B,C or D).
Eq. (6) is used to calculate the second row.
Suppose in addition to that, it becomes known that σ = 1.5. From a statistical point of
view, in the new situation mean µ is the unknown parameter of interest. The likelihoods
of µ = 0 and µ = 1 are 0.1721 and 0.2567 respectively. The likelihood ratio is 0.6704.
In terms of extended likelihood, the new situation is coded by conditional Lik1.4(· | D).
This yields Lik1.4(ω1 | D) = Lik1.4(ω3 | D) = Lik1.4(C | D) = 0 and Lik1.4(A | D) =
Lik1.4(ω2)/Lik1.4(D) = 0.6704 and Lik1.4(B | D) = Lik1.4(ω4)/Lik1.4 = 1. The ratio of
extended likelihoods of µ = 0 and of µ = 1 is 0.6704. Keeping in mind that the likelihood
principle holds that the ratio of likelihoods is what matters, we see that our definition of
conditioning of extended likelihoods conforms to the standard practice in statistics.
It is worth noting that while our derivation of the extended likelihood (CBF) is moti-
vated by statistical considerations, the properties listed in Lemma 1 are also the defining
properties of a possibility measure [12,41]. What distinguishes a possibility function from
a CBF is its fuzzy set semantics and, consequently, the notion of ordinal conditioning:
π(A | B) =
{1 if π(A∩B) = π(A)
π(A∩B) otherwise (8)
Technically, possibility theory can entertain both notions of conditioning: the ordinal
(Eq. (8)) and the numerical one specified by Eq. (7). In this sense, extended likelihood
is a possibility measure equipped with numerical conditioning.4 It is not difficult to check
(using the previous example) that if Lik was updated using ordinal conditioning then the
result would not be consistent with the likelihood principle.
4 Dubois, Moral and Prade [11] show that a possibility measure is the result of taking supremum on a family of
likelihood functions. On that semantics, the min rule for combination of possibility measures is justified.
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Let us formalize the decision problem we will study. We assume a decision situation
described by a tuple (Ω,X,A, y,π). Ω is the set of simple hypotheses (the parameter
space); X is the set of rewards measured in a utility currency; A is a set of actions of the
form Ω → X; y is the data/observation/evidence and π is the ELF 2Ω → [0,1] calculated
from y representing uncertainty on hypotheses.
For actions in this setting, the states on which rewards are contracted are not observable.
The utility nature of rewards implies that the risk attitude factor in decision making can be
ignored. Also, since utility can be transformed by a linear function, we can assume that
rewards are restricted to the unit interval [0,1]. For the sake of clarity, we assume that X
is finite and its elements are denoted by x1, x2, . . . , xr .
A simple likelihood lottery is an action coupled with a likelihood measure. Each lottery
is a mechanism that delivers rewards with associated likelihoods. Formally, a lottery L
induced by π and a is a mapping from X → [0,1] such that L(x) = π(a−1(x)) for x ∈ X
where a−1 is a set-valued inverse mapping of action a. For the remainder of this paper,
we denote a simple lottery by [L(x1)/x1,L(x2)/x2, . . .] with convention that those xj for
which L(xj ) = 0 are omitted. In this notation, a consequence x ∈ X is identified with a
unary lottery [1/x]. Notice that for any lottery [Li/xi]mi=1,
⋃
1im a
−1(xi) = Ω . Since π
is an ELF and Li = π(a−1(xi)), therefore, max1im Li = 1.
We also consider compound lotteries whose rewards are other lotteries. The set of lot-
teries is denoted by L.
3.1. Axioms
We study preference relation 	 on the set of lotteries L (	 ⊆ L2). Indifference ∼ and
strict preference  relations are derived from 	. L1 ∼ L2 iff L1 	 L2 & L2 	 L1. L1  L2
iff L1 	 L2 & L2 	 L1. We postulate that 	 satisfies five axioms similar to those proposed
by von Neumann and Morgenstern for the classical linear utility theory (in the form pre-
sented in [29]). They are as follows.
A1 Order. 	 is reflexive, transitive and complete.
Since the consequences in X are special lotteries, 	 is also the order on consequences.
We can assume that x1 	 x2 	 · · · 	 xr with x1  xr . In some cases to make clear we
are dealing with the best and the worst consequences, special notations are used for x1
and xr namely, x ≡ x1 and x ≡ xr . A lottery that involves only the best x and the worst
consequences x as potential outcomes is called a canonical lottery. The set of canonical
lotteries is denoted by Lc.
A2 Reduction of compound lotteries.
Let L = [δ1/L1, δ2/L2, . . . , δk/Lk] and Li = [κi1/x1, κi2/x2, . . . , κir/xr ] then L ∼
[κ1/x1, κ2/x2, . . . , κr/xr ] with κj = max1ik{δi .κij }.
A3 Substitutability.
If Li ∼ L′ then [δ1/L1, . . . δi/Li . . . δk/Lk] ∼ [δ1/L1, . . . δi/L′ . . . δk/Lk].i i
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For each x ∈ X there is a s ∈ Lc such that x ∼ s.
A5 Qualitative monotonicity.
[λ/x,µ/x] 	 [λ′/x,µ′/x] iff (λ λ′)& (µ µ′) (9)
Among the axioms, A1 and A3 are standard assumptions about a preference relation.
A2 is an implication of the conditioning operation. Suppose that the unknown parameter
θ is a vector. We can think, for example, θ = (γ, σ ). Let us consider a compound lottery
L = [δ1/L1, δ2/L2, . . . , δk/Lk] where Li = [κi1/x1, . . . , κir/xr ] for 1 i  k. Underlying
L, in fact, is a two-stage lottery. The first stage is associated with a scalar parameter γ . It
accepts values γ1, γ2, . . . , γk with likelihoods δ1, δ2, . . . , δk respectively. If γi is the true
value, the holder of L is rewarded with simple lottery Li that, in turn, is associated with
scalar parameter σ that accepts σoi(1), σoi(2), . . . , σoi(r) with likelihoods κi1, κi2, . . . , κir
where oi is a permutation of (1,2,3, . . . , r). When σoi(j) obtains, the holder is rewarded
with consequence xj .
Let us consider another one-stage lottery L′ that delivers xj in case tuple 〈γiσoi(j)〉 is
the true value of θ for 1 i  k. Because of conditioning equation (7), we have
Lik(γiσoi(j)) = Lik(γi)Lik(σ = σoi(j) | γ = γi) = δi .κij (10)
The set of tuples for which xj is delivered is {〈γiσoi(j)〉 | 1  i  k}. Thus, the extended
likelihood associated with consequence xj in lottery L′
Lik
({γiσoi(j) | 1 i  k})= max{δi .κij | 1 i  k} (11)
Since L and L′ have the property that no matter what is the true value of θ , the conse-
quences they deliver are always the same, we require L ∼ L′ which is axiom A2. Fig. 1
shows an example where k = 2 and r = 2, o1(1) = 1, o1(2) = 2, o2(1) = 2 and o2(2) = 1.
Axiom A4 requires that for any consequence x ∈ X there is a canonical lottery c =
[λ1/x,λ2/x] such that x ∼ c. For clarity, let us assume that x = 1, x = 0 (the argument
remains valid for any real values of x and x as long as x > x). For any x ∈ X, we need
to find a canonical lottery c equivalent to x. We will describe a likelihood gamble for this
purpose.
There are three parties in this game: the Arbiter, the House and the Player. The goal of
the game is to gauge binary utility function for the Player. The game plays as follows. The
Arbiter preselects a single parameter probability distribution fθ . She also predetermines
Fig. 1. Two-stage L and one-stage L′ are equivalent.
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as well as the possible values of the parameter are revealed to all parties. For example,
a normal distribution5 with given standard devision σ = 1 can be used as fθ where θ is
unknown mean and θ ∈ {−1,+1}.
The Arbiter secretly picks a value θ in {θ1, θ2} then generates a value y from fθ . The
mechanism used by the Arbiter to pick the value θ is unknown to both the Player and
the House. Both the Player and the House are told about the data y. The House offers a
gamble that pays x to the Player if the value actually used by the Arbiter to generate the
observation is θ1 and x if it is θ2. What is the highest price the Player would be willing to
pay for this gamble? If the answer is x, then for the Player,
x ∼ [Liky(θ1)/x,Liky(θ2)/x] (12)
where Liky(θ1) ∝ fθ1(y) and Liky(θ2) ∝ fθ2(y).
One can repeat this gamble any number of times to get a table of correspondence be-
tween xi and [Likyi (θ1)/x,Likyi (θ2)/x]. What we assume in A4 is that we can make
the table rich enough so that for any x ∈ X we can look up the table for an equivalent
[Liky(θ1)/x,Liky(θ2)/x].
Comparing the likelihood gamble with a probabilistic gamble6 used in practice to ex-
tract decision maker’s (unary) utility, we see a number of important differences. First,
instead of r.v. with a known distribution, e.g., tossing a fair coin or rolling a dice, a partially
specified probability model is used. Second, the rewards for the Player in the likelihood
gamble are contracted, not on observations (y) but on the unobservable true value of the
parameter (θ). In this sense, a likelihood gamble is a simple hypothesis testing problem
because the Player needs to decide which of two hypotheses θ = θ1 or θ = θ2 is true. The
relationship is made clear in Fig. 5.
What kind of betting behavior should be expected from a rational decision maker? Cer-
tain patterns should be excluded as irrational. In the example of a likelihood gamble that
uses a normal distribution with known s.d. σ = 1 and pays $1 if mean is −1 and 0 if it
is 1, paying $0.20 for the gamble if y = −3 and paying $0.70 if y = 1 would be irrational.
Intuitively, y = −3 lends more support to hypothesis θ = −1 than y = 1 does. Let us for-
malize this intuition. We impose a mild constraint in the form of monotonicity axiom A5.
Basically, we require that the price for lottery [λ/1,µ/0] is greater or equal to the price
for [λ′/1,µ′/0] if the likelihood of getting 1 in the former is higher than that of the latter
(λ λ′) and likelihood of getting 0 in the former is less than that of the latter (µ µ′).
We justify A5 on the basis of first order stochastic dominance (FSD). Not being strictly
Bayesian, we won’t assume to know the prior probability of P(θ = θ1), but we will assume
that such a prior exists. This situation can be modeled by viewing the prior of θ = θ1 as a
r.v. ρ taking value in the unit interval. The distribution of ρ is unknown to us. We calculate
the posterior of θ = θ1 given y and ρ.
Pρ(θ = θ1 | y) = ρ · Liky(θ1)
ρ · Liky(θ1)+ (1 − ρ) · Liky(θ2) (13)
5 Any other distribution will work as fine.
6 Suppose u($0) = 0 and u($1) = 1, and d the price a decision maker is willing to pay for a gamble that pays $1
if a toss of a fair coin turns Head and $0 if it turns Tail, then u(d) = 0.5.
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Vy(ρ) = Pρ(θ = θ1 | y) · x + Pρ(θ = θ2 | y) · x (14)
= x + Pρ(θ = θ1 | y) · (x − x) (15)
With x − x > 0, Vy(ρ) is a strictly increasing function of Pρ(θ = θ1 | y). When x = 1
and x = 0, Eq. (14) is further simplified to Vy(ρ) = Pρ(θ = θ1 | y). Being a function of ρ,
Vy(ρ) is a r.v.
The concept of stochastic dominance (SD) has been used extensively in economics,
finance, statistics [28]. Suppose X and Y are two distinct r.v. with the cumulative distrib-
utions F and G respectively. We say that X stochastically dominates (to the first degree)
Y (written as XD1Y ) iff F(x)  G(x) ∀x. Since X and Y are distinct, strict inequality
must hold for at least one value x. FSD is important because of the following equiva-
lence: X stochastically dominates (first order) Y iff the expected utility of X is greater
than or equal to the expected utility of Y for all non-decreasing utility functions i.e.,
XD1Y iff E(u(X)) E(u(Y )) ∀u ∈ U where U the class of non-decreasing utility func-
tions and E(.) is the expectation operator.
In the immediately following discussion, we will assume x = 1 and x = 0 for the sake
of clarity without any loss on generality.
Lemma 2. For ρ ∈ (0,1)
Vy(ρ) > Vy′(ρ) iff
[
Liky(θ1)/1,Liky(θ2)/0
] [Liky′(θ1)/1,Liky′(θ2)/0] (16)
Theorem 1. Suppose ρ is a r.v. taking values in the unit interval. Then Vy(ρ) stochastically
dominates (first degree) Vy′(ρ) iff[
Liky(θ1)/1,Liky(θ2)/0
] [Liky′(θ1)/1,Liky′(θ2)/0]
The order on canonical lotteries stipulated by axiom A5 is the order by first degree
stochastic dominance of their expected payoffs if the prior is r.v. In Fig. 2, the lower curve
is the graph for V0.60(ρ) (at Y = .6, the corresponding lottery is [.3011/1,1/0]) and the
upper curve is the graph for V0.26(ρ) ([.5945/1,1/0]). This completes our justification for
the five axioms.
Fig. 2. Payoff functions for y = .60 (lower) and y = .26 (upper).
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We will now proceed to study the preference relation satisfying the axioms. The follow-
ing lemma shows that the set {L/ ∼} of equivalent classes of lotteries wrt the indifference
relation ∼ is isomorphic to the set of canonical lotteries (Lc).
Lemma 3. If the preference relation 	 on the set of lotteries L satisfies axioms A1
though A5, then for each lottery there exists one and only one canonical lottery indifferent
to it.
The significance of Lemma 3 is that it reduces a comparison of lotteries to one of canon-
ical lotteries that have a simple structure and a straightforward interpretation. We want to
represent 	 by a utility function so that a comparison of lotteries can be done through
the calculation of their utilities. Our main idea here is to use as a utility scale a set that is
isomorphic to the set of canonical lotteries. Let us define
U def= {〈a, b〉 | a, b ∈ [0,1] and max(a, b) = 1} (17)
In words, U is the set of pair of numbers in the unit interval such that one of them is 1.
A linear order
—
 on U (to distinguish from the order  on scalars) is defined as
〈a, b〉
—
 〈a′, b′〉 iff


a = a′ = 1 & b b′, or
a = 1 & a′  1, or
a  a′ & b = b′ = 1
(18)
Strict preference () and indifference (=) derivatives are also used. The special structure
of U allows a simplification of order definition given in Eq. (18). The proof of the following
lemma is straightforward and is therefore omitted.
Lemma 4. For 〈a, b〉, 〈a′, b′〉 ∈ U
〈a, b〉  〈a′, b′〉 iff (a > a′)∨ (b < b′) (19)
〈a, b〉
—
 〈a′, b′〉 iff (a  a′)∧ (b b′) (20)
〈a, b〉 = 〈a′, b′〉 iff (a = a′)∧ (b = b′) (21)
We refer to U equipped with order
—
 as the binary utility scale. Roughly, we can inter-
pret two components in a utility value as indices of goodness (first) and badness (second).
One binary utility value is better than another if the goodness index of the former is higher
than that of the latter or the badness index of the former is smaller than badness index of
the latter. Note that this binary utility is a special case of the lexicographic utility [16].
Lemma 4 shows that two indices have symmetrical roles, no one has precedence over the
other. One index is used as tie breaking in case equality holds for the other index.
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To operate on binary utilities, we extend7 product and max operations to work with
pairs as follows. For scalar α,β,π and γ
α.〈β,γ 〉 def= 〈α.β,α.γ 〉 (22)
max
(〈α,β〉, 〈γ,π〉) def= 〈max(α, γ ),max(β,π)〉 (23)
We have some properties of the extended max operation. The proof is straightforward
and is therefore omitted.
Lemma 5. (i) U is closed under max, i.e., u,u′ ∈ U then max(u,u′) ∈ U . (ii) max is
monotone on each argument, for example, max(u, v)
—
 max(u, v′) if v  v′.
3.3. Representation theorem
A utility function is a mapping from the set of lotteries into the utility scale U :L→ U .
We say that a preference relation 	 is represented by a utility function U whenever L 	 L′
iff U(L)
—
 U(L′). For a function f defined on set X, we let f (X) denote {f (x) | x ∈ X}.
We have the following theorem.
Theorem 2. 	 on L satisfies axioms A1 through A5 if and only if there exists a utility
function QU :L→ U representing 	 such that 〈1,0〉, 〈0,1〉 ∈ QU(X) and
QU([π1/L1, . . . , πk/Lk])= max
1ik
{
πi.QU(Li)
} (24)
While proposing axioms A1 through A5, we argue the rationale for each axiom sep-
arately, but not the consistency of the axiom system as a whole. The fact that the axiom
system is represented by a well defined utility function proves that it is free from inconsis-
tency. In particular, when L is a simple lottery, Eq. (24) can be rewritten as
QU([π1/x1, . . . , πr/xr ])= max
1ir
{
πi.QU(xi)
} (25)
7 We have decided in favor of “overloading” operations product and max instead of creating new symbols.
Hopefully, this slight abuse of notation does not lead to any confusion because the type of arguments will indicate
which rule to apply.
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The form of QU in (25) resembles the vNM expected utility expression. The expected
utility of a probabilistic lottery p on X is defined as U(p) def= ∑1ir p(xi).U(xi).
Maximization in (25) plays the same role as its counterpart—addition—in the vNM
expected utility. This similarity leads us to refer to QU also as expected qualitative utility
function.
Fig. 4 illustrates QU calculation for a two-stage lottery. Assuming QU(x1) = 〈1,0〉,
QU(x2) = 〈1, .8〉 and QU(x3) = 〈0,1〉, a roll-back calculation shows that
QU([1/[.4/x1, .7/x2,1/x3], .5/[1/x1, .2/x3]])= 〈.7,1〉
Although qualitative and vNM utilities share fundamental structure, it is important to
emphasize that the qualitative utility is not just a simple translation of vNM utility in a new
language. Not all properties of vNM utility hold for the qualitative version. Notably, the
qualitative utility only satisfies weaker versions of independence and Archimedian proper-
ties [25].
Theorem 3. (a) Suppose L1,L2,L3 ∈ L, λ,µ ∈ [0,1] and max(λ,µ) = 1. If L1 	 L2,
then [λ/L1,µ/L3] 	 [λ/L2,µ/L3].
(b) Suppose L1,L2,L3 ∈ L such that L1  L2  L3. Then there exists λ,µ,λ′,µ′ ∈
[0,1], max(λ,µ) = max(λ′,µ′) = 1 and 〈λ,µ〉, 〈λ′,µ′〉 /∈ {〈0,1〉, 〈1,0〉} such that [λ/L1,
µ/L3]  L2 and L2  [λ′/L1,µ′/L3].
Note that property (a) does not hold for strict preference. That is, in general, we don’t
have [λ/L1,µ/L3]  [λ/L2,µ/L3] if L1  L2.
3.4. Related work
In the AI literature, a number of decision models that do not assume probability have
been studied [7,24,37]. Brafman and Tennenholtz [7] characterize qualitative decision
rules: maximin, minimax regret and competitive ratios and maximax. They show that these
different decision criteria are equivalent in terms of representation power. These purely
qualitative rules ignore the uncertainty relevant to choice problem. Smets [37] proposes
a two-level decision model for Dempster–Shafer belief functions. At the credal level, an
agent uses belief functions to represent and reason with uncertainty. When she needs to
make decision she will translate a belief function into probability using pignistic trans-
formation. Basically, this transformation allocates the probability mass that assigned to a
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For example, when applied for Ellsberg’s paradox [15], this model produces an unintuitive
solution. Halpern [24] studies a very general uncertainty measure called the plausibility
measure. To make decisions, he defines an operation that maps the product of consequence
domain and plausibility domain into a valuation domain. The order on valuation domain
is defined by a decision rule. In [20], we also study a decision making model for Spohn’s
theory of epistemic beliefs. This uncertainty measure is closely related to extended like-
lihood, and can be interpreted as order-of-magnitude approximation of probabilities or as
degrees of plain beliefs.
More relevant to this work is an approach to decision making with possibility the-
ory proposed by Dubois et al. [10,13]. As noted earlier, a possibility function satisfies
Eqs. (5), (6) that define an ELF. The main difference is about the conditioning operation.
Dubois et al. use the ordinal conditioning defined by Eq. (8). The likelihood conditioning
(or the numerical conditioning) is defined in Eq. (7). They distinguish two decision crite-
ria: pessimistic and optimistic. For each decision criterion, there is an axiom system and
a qualitative utility functional representing preference relation that satisfies the axioms.
A detailed comparative analysis between our approach vs the approach argued by Dubois
et al. is presented in [22]. We show that our approach, modified for ordinal conditioning,
generalizes and unifies pessimistic and optimistic decision criteria.
In our framework, a decision maker’s attitude toward ambiguity shows itself in her
basic utility assignment for consequences in X. Recall that the indifference between a
consequence and a (binary) utility value is determined through a likelihood gamble. We
will see that her betting behavior encodes an interesting information, namely, her attitude
toward ambiguity.
Suppose that our decision maker equates payoff x with canonical lottery [λ/1,µ/0].
From the Bayesian decision theory point of view, this indifference means that the expected
payoff Vy(ρ) (with respect to prior ρ) of the likelihood gamble is equal to x. Substitute x
for Vy(ρ) and λ,µ for Liky(θ1),Liky(θ2) into Eq. (13) and solve for ρ we find
ρ = xµ
(1 − x)λ+ xµ (26)
From Eq. (26) we have
logit(ρ) = logit(x)− ln(λ/µ) (27)
where logit(z) def= ln(z/(1 − z)). We call ρ calculated by Eq. (27) an implicit prior8 for the
obvious reason. When λ = µ = 1 we have ρ = x. Therefore, ρ can be interpreted as the
price the decision maker pays for a “fair” likelihood lottery [1/1,1/0].
Recall that in the context of a likelihood gamble, ρ is the probability, in Player’s judg-
ment, that the Arbiter selects θ1 (on which x is contracted) as the parameter value to gen-
erate the given observation. Thus inequality ρ < 0.5 can be interpreted as that the Player
a priori deems the bad outcome is more likely than the good one. English language has a
8 It is necessary to note that the implicit prior value is unique for a single bet. A betting behavior that implies
different implicit priors for different likelihood gambles can still be consistent with A5. For more details on the
range of permissible priors, readers are referred to [19].
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Fig. 5. Risk and ambiguity in transformation from money to binary utility.
specific name for the mental attitude that tends to emphasize adverse aspects—pessimism.
Similarly, the opposite ρ > 0.5 can be argued as a manifestation of optimism. This defin-
ition of pessimism (optimism) is very different than the notion of pessimism (optimism)9
put forward by Dubois et al. [10] where it is a property of an axiom system attributed to a
decision maker. In this paper, however, pessimism (optimism) is a property attributed to a
basic utility assignment by a decision maker.
Another sensible terminology can be used for pessimism and optimism. A betting
behavior is said to exhibit ambiguity averse (ρ < 0.5), ambiguity neutral (ρ = 0.5) or am-
biguity seeking (ρ > 0.5) attitudes. It is useful to analyze similarity as well as distinction
between the notion of ambiguity attitude and the established notion of risk attitude. The
latter is a property of a utility function (money-to-utility conversion). Risk averse, risk
neutral and risk seeking attitudes correspond to concavity, linearity and convexity of utility
functions. In this paper, we do not explicitly consider the risk attitude issue because of the
assumption that X measured in a utility currency. Fig. 5 illustrates the roles of risk and
ambiguity attitudes in the transformation of monetary reward to a binary utility via unary
utility.
In Economics and Statistics literature, a prominent axiomatic decision theory without
additive probability has been studied by Schmeidler [33] and extended by Gilboa [23] and
Sarin and Wakker [32]. The concept of co-monotonicity has a crucial role in Schmeidler’s
system. Two acts f and g are co-monotonic if for no two states s1, s2 f (s1)  f (s2) and
g(s2)  g(s1). The independence property is required to hold only for set of co-monotonic
acts. The preference relation that satisfies Schmeidler’s axioms is represented by a Choquet
expected utility function (CEU). A real-valued function v : 2Ω → [0,1] is called capacity
function if v(∅) = 0, v(Ω) = 1 and for A ⊆ B ⊆ Ω v(A) v(B). CEUv(f ) is defined as
follows. For simplicity, we assume that X is a set of reals, interpreted as utilities, and is
ordered x0 > x1 > · · · > xm. For an act f , Afk def= {s ∈ Ω | f (s) xk}—set of states where
f delivers xk or better consequence. Obviously Afi are nested, i.e., A
f
0 ⊆ Af1 ⊆ · · · ⊆
A
f
m = Ω
CEUv(f )
def= x0v(Af0 )+
k∑
i=1
xi
(
v(A
f
i )− v(Afi−1)
) (28)
The main difference between Schmeidler’s approach and our approach is in the role of a
conditioning operation for uncertainty measure. CEU representation is the result of con-
sidering (i) separation of “utility” from “probability” and (ii) “functional representations
9 The definition of pessimism (optimism) by Dubois et al. requires that possibilistic lottery π is preferred to
(less preferred than) lottery π ′ if the possibility of getting any consequence in π ′ is greater or equal to the
possibility of getting that consequence in π , i.e., π 	pes π ′ (π ′ 	opt π ) if π ′  π .
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tation and the other has a “utility” interpretation” [33, p. 584]. The updating operation is
not explicitly considered for capacity function. In contrast, our approach starts with an
uncertainty calculus with its properly defined updating rules and then develops a decision
theory where utility is derived from “probability”. In this sense, although an ELF satisfies
requirements for a capacity measure, it is not a special case of capacity because it has a
well defined conditioning operation.
To see the difference between CEU and QU, let us calculate CEU for a canonical
act with respect to ELF π . Suppose for simplicity x = 1 and x = −1. Since Aa0 = A and
Aa1 = Ω , by Eq. (28)
CEUπ
([A/x,A/x])= π(A)− (1 − π(A))= 2π(A)− 1
First we observe that CEU for a canonical act does not depend on the capacity of event
leading to the worst consequence. v(A) = 1 − v(A) because a capacity measure is non-
additive. In contrast, A5 requires a comparison of likelihoods of getting worst consequence
when the likelihoods of getting the best consequence are equal. This observation seems to
suggest that CEU is not appropriate for existing (non-probabilistic) uncertainty calculi
such as Dempster–Shafer belief functions [35], fuzzy possibility [41] and plausibility mea-
sures [24] that have well-defined updating rules.
The lack of an updating rule for capacity subjects CEU to the following criticism. Sup-
pose v is a capacity measure, one can define its dual by v′(A) def= 1 − v(A) ∀A ⊆ Ω . It is
not difficult to see that v′ is also a capacity measure. It is arguable that v and v′ contain
the same information because v is recoverable from v′. Despite visible symmetry between
v and v′, rankings of acts by CEUv and by CEUv′ are different. In this sense, CEU is not
sensitive to information. Such criticism is void for uncertainty calculi with well defined up-
dating rules. The dual of a probability measure is itself. The dual of a possibility measure is
a necessity measure but their updating rules are different. The same is also true for the dual
pair of belief and plausibility functions in Dempster–Shafer theory. Thus, the measures are
not symmetric despite being duals of each other.
4. Likelihood solution to statistical inference
4.1. Decision-theoretic approach to statistical inference
We will review the decision-theoretic approach to statistical inference. We assume as
given the set of alternative actions denoted by A, and the sample space of Y by Y . A loss
V (a, θ) measures the loss that arises if we take action a and the true value of the parameter
is θ .10 A decision rule is a mapping δ :Y → A, that is for observation y the rule recom-
10 In terms of the decision problem definition (Section 3), any superset of V (A,Ω), the set of possible loss
values, could be the set of consequences X.
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as
R
(
δ(Y ), θ
) def= EθV (δ(Y ), θ)=
∫
Y
V
(
δ(y), θ
)
pθ(y) (29)
The risk function measures the average loss by adopting the rule δ in case θ is the true
value.
The further use of risk functions depends on how much information we assume is avail-
able. For each point in the parameter space, there is a value of the risk function. In case no
a priori information about parameter exists, Wald [39] advocated the use of minimax rule
which minimizes the worst risk that could be attained by a rule.
δ∗minimax = arg min
δ∈∆ maxθ∈Ω R(δ, θ) (30)
where ∆ is the set of decision rules. δ∗ is called the minimax solution.
If we assume, as the Bayesian school does, the existence of a prior distribution for the
parameter, then the risk could be averaged out to one number called Bayes risk
r(δ) = EρR(δ, θ) =
∫
Ω
R(δ, θ)ρ(θ) (31)
where ρ is prior distribution for θ . Then the optimal rule is one that minimizes the Bayes
risk which is called the Bayes solution.
δ∗Bayes,ρ = arg min
δ∈∆ r(δ) (32)
Wald [39] pointed out there exists a prior distribution ρ∗ called “the least favorable” for
which the Bayes solution is the minimax solution. The term “Bayes” is justified by the
fact that the solution is also obtained via a more intuitive route using Bayes theorem and
the principle of minimizing expected loss. Given prior probability distribution ρ on Ω , for
each data y ∈ Y a posterior probability on Ω is obtained via Bayes theorem
p(θ | y) ∝ pθ(y)ρ(θ) (33)
Denote by ap(y) the action that minimizes the expected loss given data y
ap(y) = arg min
a∈A
∫
Ω
V (a, θ)p(θ | y) (34)
Let us define a rule δ∗P (y) → ap(y), i.e., for each data y, rule δ∗P delivers the action that
minimizes the expected loss.
Lemma 6. δ∗P is a Bayes solution, i.e., r(δ∗P ) = r(δ∗Bayes,ρ).
4.2. Likelihood solution
Without knowing prior ρ, we propose the following solution based on the logic that
leads to δ∗ . Each y ∈ Y is associated with an ELF Liky . An action together with an ELFP
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vation y. Likelihood lotteries are compared by QU. The optimal action given observation
y is
aLik(y) = arg sup
a∈A
QU(La(y)) (35)
where sup11 is the operation taking maximum element according to the binary order
—
 .
We define a decision rule δ∗Lik(y) → aLik(y) which assigns for each point in the sample
space an action that maximizes the (qualitative) utility. We call such decision rule a likeli-
hood solution.
There are two dimensions in which solutions δ∗minimax, δ∗Bayes and δ∗Lik can be compared.
The first concerns information. One can differentiate two kinds of information relevant to
the statistical inference problem: the extra-experiment information embodied by a prior
probability and the experimental information embodied by a likelihood function. The
Bayesian approach requires both kinds and utilizes them to arrive at the solution. In Wald’s
proposal, the risk function has no special role for the actually observed data and the prior
probability is not considered. Thus both kinds of information are ignored. The likelihood
solution does not assume knowing the prior, but it does make use of likelihood information
provided by data in identifying the best action.
The concept of stochastic dominance provides another dimension for comparing the
three solutions. Apart from FSD, stochastic dominance of second and higher degree are
defined. For simplicity, following [6], assume r.v. are non-negative, i.e., cumulative distri-
bution functions satisfy F(0) = 0. For cumulative distribution function F , define for any
natural n
Fn(z) =
z∫
0
Fn−1(x)dx (36)
with notation F1 = F . Suppose X,Y are two r.v. (we use the same symbols for their cumu-
lative distribution function), we say X is preferred to Y according to n-degree stochastic
dominance (write XnSDY ) if Xn(z) Yn(z) for z 0. It is well known that (i) n-degree
dominance implies all higher degree dominance and (ii) higher the degree, the greater rel-
ative importance is assigned to small value of r.v. Borch [6] shows that Wald’s minimax
rule is equivalent to stochastic dominance of infinite degree. The order satisfying vNM
axioms can be viewed as “zero degree” stochastic dominance because it boils down to the
comparison of numbers—expected utility values—that are, of course, singular r.v. Thus,
we can arrange Bayes, likelihood and minimax solutions in an increasing order according
to their SD degrees.
4.3. An illustrative example
The following example is adapted from [3]. The manufacturer of small travel clocks
which are sold through a chain of department stores agrees to service any clock once only
11 In contrast to max defined in Eq. (23) that operates on scalars .
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must be made on whether to merely clean it or replace the works, i.e., the set of actions
A= {a1, a2} where a1 denotes “clean the clock then replace the work if needed”, and a2
denotes “immediately replace the works”.
Let us assume that there are only two possible faults, i.e., Ω = {θ1, θ2} where θ1 means
there is the need for cleaning and θ2 means the clock has been physically damaged and the
works need replacement. Utility and loss functions are given in the following table. The
relationship between utility (u) and loss (V ) is through equation V = 1 − u.
u(a, θ) θ1 θ2
a1 .8 .3
a2 .5 .5
V (a, θ) θ1 θ2
a1 .2 .7
a2 .5 .5
The loss table is roughly estimated from the fact that cleaning a clock costs $0.20 and re-
placing the works costs $0.50. If the policy is to replace the works for every clock needing
service then the cost is $0.50 no matter which problem is present. If the policy is to clean
a clock first, if the state is θ1 then the service costs $0.20, however in the case of physical
damage then cleaning alone obviously does not fix the problem and the manufacturer ends
up replacing the works also. Thus the total cost is $0.70.
The manufacturer can ask the customer to provide a symptom of malfunction when a
clock is sent to the service center. Assume the sample space Y = {y1, y2, y3} where y1
means “the clock has stopped operating”, y2—“the clock is erratic in timekeeping” and
y3—“clock can only run for a limited period”. Such information gives some indication
about θ that is expressed in terms of likelihood
liky(θ) or pθ (y) y1 y2 y3
θ1 .1 .4 .5
θ2 .7 .2 .1
For each point in the sample space, you can either choose a1 or a2, so there are 8 possible
decision rules in total. Each decision rule specifies an action given an observation.
δj (yi ) δ1 δ2 δ3 δ4 δ5 δ6 δ7 δ8
y1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a2 a2 a2 a2
y2 a1 a1 a2 a2 a1 a1 a2 a2
y3 a1 a2 a1 a2 a1 a2 a1 a2
We calculate the risk function values for each rule and parameter value in the following
table
Rij δ1 δ2 δ3 δ4 δ5 δ6 δ7 δ8
θ1 .2 .35 .32 .47 .23 .38 .35 .50
θ2 .7 .68 .66 .64 .56 .54 .52 .50
Notice that there is no rule which is superior to all other for both values of θ . Wald’s
minimax solution is δ8. If we assume prior distribution of θ then we can calculate the Bayes
risks for the rules. For example if prior probability p(θ1) = .7, then Bayes risks r.7(δi) are
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.35 .449 .442 .541 .329 .428 .401 .50
Thus, δ5 is the Bayes solution. The following sensitivity analysis shows how Bayes solu-
tions depend on prior p(θ1)
Bayes solution When
δ8 p(θ1) .118
δ7 .118 p(θ1) .250
δ5 .250 p(θ1) .824
δ1 .824 p(θ1)
In our approach, suppose unary utility is translated into binary utility according to the
following table. The table is obtained assuming ambiguity neutrality. For example, to find
a binary utility equivalent to 0.8, plugging x = 0.8 and implicit prior ρ = 0.5 into Eq. (27)
we have logit(0.8) = ln(λ/µ) + logit(0.5). Therefore, λ/µ = 4. Since max(λ,µ) = 1 we
have λ = 1 and µ = .25. Thus 0.8 ∼ 〈1,0.25〉.
Unary utility Binary utility
.8 〈1, .25〉
.5 〈1,1〉
.3 〈.43,1〉
Given y1, the ELF is Liky1(θ1) = .14 and Liky1(θ2) = 1. Action a1 corresponds to lottery
La1(y1) = [.14/〈1, .25〉,1/〈.43,1〉]
QU(La1(y1))= max{.14〈1, .25〉,1〈.43,1〉}
= max{〈.14, .035〉, 〈.43,1〉}= 〈.43,1〉
Action a2 is associated with lottery La2(y1) = [.14/〈1,1〉,1/〈1,1〉] and QU(La2(y1)) =〈1,1〉. Thus, a2 y1 a1. Given y2, Liky2(θ1) = 1 and Liky2(θ2) = .5. So, QU(La1(y2)) =〈1, .5〉 and QU(La2(y2)) = 〈1,1〉. Thus, a1 y2 a2. Given y3, Liky2(θ1) = 1 and
Liky2(θ2) = .2. QU(La1(y3)) = 〈1, .25〉 and QU(La2(y3)) = 〈1,1〉. Thus, a1 y3 a2. In
summary, the likelihood solution is δ5.
It is also interesting to know how likelihood solutions depend on the ambiguity attitude.
It can be shown
Likelihood solution Implicit prior
δ7 ρ  0.3333
δ5 0.3334 ρ
Let us make few informal comments. Depending on ambiguity attitude, the likelihood
solution can be δ7 or δ5 while the minimax solution is δ8. As we noted, the latter ignores
the uncertainty generated by an observation while the former does not.
If the prior probability is a value in interval [0.250,0.824], then the Bayes solution is
δ5 the same as the likelihood solution when the ambiguity attitude ρ is in [0.3334,1]. If
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the “optimality” of the Bayes solution does not come without cost. The prior probability
requirement can be satisfied either at some monetary cost (doing research, or buying from
those who have) that should have been deducted from the benefit of having the optimal ac-
tion. Alternatively, the decision maker can just assume some prior distribution in an ad hoc
manner. This, however, would compromise the claimed optimality. One can extend the
concept of Bayes solution by including a sensitivity analysis. This certainly helps decision
maker by providing a frame of reference. But sensitivity analysis itself does not constitute
any basis for knowing the prior probability. Moreover, when the parameter space is large,
a multiple way sensitivity analysis may be very difficult.
The behavior comparison of the likelihood solution and the Bayes solution when ρ
and p(θ1) vary is more interesting. When p(θ1) increases from 0 to 1, the Bayes solu-
tion moves from δ8 to δ7 to δ5 and to δ1. When ρ increases from 0 to 1, the likelihood
solution moves from δ7 to δ5. Thus, the likelihood solutions do not include δ8, δ1 that cor-
respond to Bayes solutions at extreme values of prior p(θ1). In particular, δ7 chooses a1
and δ8 chooses a2 at y3. δ1 chooses a1 and δ5 chooses a2 at y1. There are two factors that
ameliorate this discrepancy. First, extreme values of p(θ1) are far from non-informative
priors which can be expected in a situation of no prior information. In other words, by
selecting p(θ1) close to 0 or 1, the decision maker has some (or is willing to assume)
significant a priori information that would make the comparison with likelihood solution
void. Second, at extreme values of implicit prior ρ, the utilities of a1 and a2 (at any ob-
servation) are very close. For example, if ρ = 0.1 then QU(La1(y3)) = 〈1,0.052〉 and
QU(La2(y3)) = 〈1,0.111〉. At non-extreme cases the likelihood solution and the Bayes
solution basically agree. Decision rules δ7, δ5 are selected in both approaches for large
segments of values p(θ1) and ρ.
This pattern is comforting but one should be careful not to draw too much from it.
Specifically, one should not use this agreement as a justification for the likelihood solution.
As we pointed out, axioms A1 to A5 on which likelihood solution is based, are structurally
similar to those used by Luce and Raiffa [29] to justify the expected utility maximization
principle which ultimately is the basis for Bayes solutions. Thus, at a foundational level,
optimality of likelihood solution could be justified in the same way as the optimality for
Bayes solution although the two optimality concepts are obviously different. It can be
argued that the question of which optimality is more appropriate depends on how much
information is available.
Although p(θ1) and ρ have similar roles on the behavior of solutions, they have
very different semantics. p(θ1) is a specification of prior probability on the parameter
space. Therefore, it gauges the a priori information (empirical or assumed) about pa-
rameters. In practice, when this space has many elements, the specification would be
much more difficult and sensitivity analysis becomes more complex. ρ, on the other
hand, gauges the attitude toward ambiguity of a decision maker. It is determined, in-
dependently to the parameter space, on simple situations of two hypotheses and fixed
rewards.
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In this paper, we develop a decision theory that directly utilizes likelihood information
without assuming the knowledge of prior probability. We extend likelihood functions as
the uncertainty measure pertaining to a statistical inference problem. This extension, con-
forming to the maximum likelihood methods, defines the likelihood for a set of parameter
values to be the maximum likelihood over elements of the set.
Our approach is axiomatic. The axioms considered are similar in spirit to those of the
linear utility theory, but strictly different in several important aspects. We describe a bet-
ting behavior based on likelihood rather than on probability. This behavior satisfies the
stochastic dominance principle. We prove a representation theorem for preference relation
over likelihood lotteries using a newly developed concept of binary utility.
Applied to the statistical inference problem, our theory suggests a new solution that
picks an action by maximizing expected qualitative utility. This solution is sandwiched
between Wald’s minimax solution and the Bayes solution in terms of information use and
demand. It makes use of uncertainty information that is ignored by the minimax solution
but does not require a prior probability as the Bayes solution does.
Appendix A. Proofs of lemmas and theorems
Proof of Lemma 2. By Eq. (15), Vy(ρ) > Vy′(ρ) iff Pρ(θ = θ1 | y) > Pρ(θ = θ1 | y′). By
Eq. (13), Pρ(θ = θ1 | y) > Pρ(θ = θ1 | y′) iff
Liky(θ1)
Liky(θ2)
>
Liky′(θ1)
Liky′(θ2)
(A.1)
Because max(Liky(θ1),Liky(θ2)) = max(Liky′(θ1),Liky′(θ2)) = 1, there are 4 cases to
consider. Eq. (A.1) excludes the case where Liky(θ2) = Liky′(θ1) = 1. For 3 remaining
cases, we have (a) If Liky(θ1) = Liky′(θ1) = 1, Eq. (A.1) holds iff Liky(θ2) < Liky′(θ2);
(b) If Liky(θ2) = Liky′(θ2) = 1, Eq. (A.1) holds iff Liky(θ1) > Liky′(θ1); (c) If Liky(θ1) =
Liky′(θ2) = 1, Eq. (A.1) holds iff either Liky(θ2) < 1 or Liky′(θ1) < 1. By Eq. (9), we have
Eq. (A.1) holds iff [Liky(θ1)/1,Liky(θ2)/0]  [Liky′(θ1)/1,Liky′(θ2)/0]. 
Proof of Theorem 1. (⇒) For any v ∈ (0,1), let us denote the roots of equations
Vy(ρ) = v and Vy′(ρ) = v by ρv and ρ′v respectively, i.e., Vy(ρv) = v and Vy′(ρ′v) = v. If
[Liky(θ1)/1,Liky(θ2)/0]  [Liky′(θ1)/1,Liky′(θ2)/0] then by Eq. (16) Vy(ρv) > Vy′(ρv).
Therefore, Vy′(ρ′v) > Vy′(ρv). Because Vy′(ρ) is strictly increasing, we infer ρv < ρ′v .
Since Vy(ρ) and Vy′(ρ) are increasing, P(Vy(ρ) v) = P(ρ  ρv) and P(Vy′(ρ) v) =
P(ρ  ρ′v). Because ρv < ρ′v , P(Vy(ρ) v) P(Vy′(ρ) v). This last inequality means
Vy(ρ) D1 Vy′(ρ).
(⇐) If for all 0 < x < 1, Vy(x) Vy′(x), then assumption Vy(ρ)D1Vy′(ρ) is violated.
Otherwise, Eq. (16) implies that[
Liky(θ1)/1,Liky(θ2)/0
] [Liky′(θ1)/1,Liky′(θ2)/0] 
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on the depth of lottery trees. For a constant lottery (of depth 0), because of A4, each con-
sequence xi is indifferent to a canonical lottery si . Let assume xi ∼ si = [κi1/x, κir/x] for
1 i  r .
A lottery of depth 1 is a simple lottery. If it is a canonical lottery, by reflexivity, a canon-
ical lottery is indifferent to itself. For a simple lottery L = [π1/x1,π2/x2, . . . , πr/xr ],
by A3, L ∼ L1 where L1 = [π1/s1,π2/s2, . . . , πr/sr ]. L1 can be reduced to a canon-
ical lottery L2 such that L1 ∼ L2 as follows. Let us write a canonical lottery si in
the form [κi1/x, κi2/x2, . . . , κir/x] with κij = 0 for 2  j  r − 1. By A2, L1 ∼ L2
where L2 = [κ1/x, κ2/x2, . . . , κr/x] with κj = max{πi.κij | 1 i  k}. Since κij = 0 for
2  j  r − 1, we have κj = 0 for 2  j  r − 1. Thus, L2 is a canonical lottery. By
transitivity, L ∼ L2.
Suppose for any lottery of depth not greater than n, there is a canonical lottery in-
different to it. For a lottery L of depth n+ 1. This lottery is a compound lottery whose
consequences are lotteries of depth not greater than n. Because of induction hypothesis,
each consequence of L is indifferent to a canonical lottery. By substitutability, L is indif-
ferent to a compound lottery of depth 2 which, in turn, is indifferent to a canonical lottery
by induction hypothesis. By transitivity, L is indifferent to some canonical lottery.
Finally, we have to show that there is only one canonical lottery indifferent to a given
lottery. Suppose there are two canonical lotteries s1, s2 ∈ Lc such that s1 ∼ L and s2 ∼ L.
By A1, we have s1 ∼ s2. But by A5, this is possible only if s1 = s2. 
Proof of Theorem 2. (⇒) Suppose 	 satisfies the axioms. We will show that there
exists a function QU :L→ U that satisfies Eq. (24) and represents 	. We construct func-
tion QU as follows. For a canonical lottery, define QU([λ/x,µ/x]) = 〈λ,µ〉. Obviously,
〈1,0〉, 〈0,1〉 ∈ QU(X). For any lottery L, by Lemma 3, there exists a unique canonical
s such that L ∼ s, we set QU(L) = QU(s). Obviously, QU is well defined. By Eqs. (9)
and (18), for canonical lotteries s, s′ we have s 	 s′ iff QU(s)
—
 QU(s′). That fact to-
gether with Lemma 3 and the way by which QU is defined allow us to conclude QU
represents 	.
Now, we will show that QU satisfies Eq. (24). Consider depth-one lottery L =
[π1/x1, . . . , πr/xr ]. By A4, each consequence xi is indifferent to a canonical lot-
tery, say si = [κi1/x, κir/x]. Therefore, QU(xi) = 〈κi1, κir 〉. Consider lottery L′ =
[π1/s1,π2/s2, . . . , πr/sr ]. From A3, L ∼ L′. Using A2 and the argument in the proof
of Lemma 3, we have L′ is indifferent to canonical lottery s = [κ1/x, κr/x] where
κl = max
1ir
{πi.κil} where l ∈ {1, r} (A.2)
Therefore, on one hand QU(L) = QU(L′) = QU(s) = 〈κ1, κr 〉. On the other hand,
max
1ir
{
πi.QU(xi)
}= max
1ir
{
πi.〈κi1, κir 〉
}= max
1ir
{〈πi.κi1,πi .κir 〉}
= 〈 max
1ir
{πi.κi1}, max
1ir
{πi.κir}
〉= 〈κ1, κr 〉
Thus, we show QU(L) = max1ir{πi.QU(xi)}. By induction on lottery’s depth, we
can prove this property for any lottery.
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QU(X), i.e., L 	q L′ iff QU(L)
—
 QU(L′). We show that 	q satisfies axioms A1
through A5. A1 is satisfied because relation
—
 defined on U by Eq. (18) is reflexive,
complete and transitive.
Let L = [π1/L1, . . . , πi/Li, . . . , πk/Lk] and L′ = [π1/L1, . . . , πi/L′i , . . . , πk/Lk]. As-
sume Li ∼q L′i . By definition of 	q , it means QU(Li) = QU(L′i ). Apply Eq. (24) twice for
compound lotteries L,L′. We see that the right-hand sides are identical. So the left-hand
sides which are QU(L) and QU(L′) must be equal. By definition of 	q , we have L ∼q L′.
Thus, A3 is satisfied.
Let L = [π1/L1,π2/L2, . . . , πk/Lk] where Li = [κi1/x1, κi2/x2, . . . , κir/xr ] for 1 
i  k. Let us assume QU(xj ) = 〈λj ,µj 〉 for 1 j  r . Apply Eq. (24) for Li and then L,
QU(Li) = max
1jr
{
κij .〈λj ,µj 〉
}= max
1jr
{〈κij .λj , κij .µj 〉}
= 〈 max
1jr
{κij .λj }, max
1jr
{κij .µj }
〉
QU(L) = max
1ik
{
πi.
〈
max
1jr
{κij .λj }, max
1jr
{κij .µj }
〉}
= max
1ik
{〈
πi. max
1jr
{κij .λj },πi . max
1jr
{κij .µj }
〉}
= 〈 max
1ik
{πi. max
1jr
{κij .λj }
}
, max
1ik
{
πi. max
1jr
{κij .µj }
}〉
= 〈 max
1ik
{
max
1jr
{πi.κij .λj }
}
, max
1ik
{
max
1jr
{πi.κij .µj }
}〉
= 〈 max
1jr
max
1ik
{πi.κij .λj }, max
1jr
max
1ik
{πi.κij .µj }
〉
Let us consider the simple lottery mentioned in A2: Ls = [κ1/x1, . . . , κr/xr ] where
κj = max
1ik
{πj .κij }
Apply Eq. (24) for Ls , we have
QU(Ls) = max
1jr
{
κj .〈λj ,µj 〉
}= max
1jr
{〈κj .λj , κj .µj 〉}
= max
1jr
{〈
max
1ik
{πj .κij .λj }, max
1ik
{πj .κij .µj }
〉}
= 〈 max
1jr
max
1ik
{πj .κij .λj }, max
1jr
max
1ik
{πj .κij .µj }
〉
Comparing the last expressions, we have QU(L) = QU(Ls). By definition of 	q , L ∼q Ls .
Thus, A2 is satisfied.
Denote by x, x the elements of X such that QU(x) = 〈1,0〉 and QU(x) = 〈0,1〉. By
Eq. (18) and definition of 	q , we have x 	q x and x 	q x for all x ∈ X. For any canon-
ical lottery [λ/x,µ/x] where max{λ,µ} = 1, by Eq. (24) we have QU([λ/x,µ/x]) =
max{λ.〈1,0〉,µ.〈0,1〉} = max{〈λ,0〉, 〈0,µ〉} = 〈λ,µ〉. Thus, by Eq. (18) we conclude that
A5 is satisfied.
Finally, for x ∈ X, let assume QU(x) = 〈λ,µ〉. By above argument, we have QU(x) =
QU([λ/x,µ/x]). By definition of 	q we infer x ∼q [λ/x,µ/x]. Thus, A4 is satisfied. 
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(a) If L1 ∼ L2, then the conclusion is a result of substitutability. Suppose L1  L2. This
means λ1  λ2 & µ1  µ2 and at least one of them is a strict relation. Applying Theorem 2,
we have
QU([λ/L1,µ/L3])= 〈max(λ.λ1,µ.λ3),max(λ.µ1,µ.µ3)〉
QU([λ/L2,µ/L3])= 〈max(λ.λ2,µ.λ3),max(λ.µ2,µ.µ3)〉
So, max(λ.λ1,µ.λ3)  max(λ.λ2,µ.λ3), max(λ.µ1,µ.µ3)  max(λ.µ2,µ.µ3). This
means QU([λ/L1,µ/L3])
—
 QU([λ/L2,µ/L3]). By representation theorem
[λ/L1,µ/L3] 	 [λ/L2,µ/L3].
(b) L1  L2  L3 means λ1  λ2  λ3 & µ1  µ2  µ3 and for indices 1 i < j  3
either λi > λj or µi < µj . We will identify λ,µ  0 satisfying max(λ,µ) = 1 such that
[λ/L1,µ/L3]  L2. Since QU([λ/L1,µ/L3]) = 〈max(λ.λ1,µ.λ3),max(λ.µ1,µ.µ3)〉,
the requirement will satisfied if either max(λ.λ1,µ.λ3) > λ2 or max(λ.µ1,µ.µ3) < µ2.
If λ1 > λ2, choosing λ = 1 will satisfy the former inequality. Otherwise λ1 = λ2, we
have then µ1 < µ2. We choose λ = 1 and µ strictly positive and small enough so that
µ.µ3 < µ2. Thus max(λ.µ1,µ.µ3) < µ2. Similarly, we can choose λ′,µ′ so that L2 
[λ′/L1,µ′/L3]. 
Proof of Lemma 6. We need to show that the Bayes risk for δ∗P is minimal, i.e.,
∀δ ∈ ∆ r(δ∗P ) r(δ) (A.3)
Substitute Eq. (29) into Eq. (31), we have
r(δ) =
∫
Ω
∫
Y
V
(
δ(y), θ
)
pθ(y)ρ(θ) =
∫
Y
∫
Ω
V
(
δ(y), θ
)
pθ(y)ρ(θ) (A.4)
It would be enough to show that ∀y ∈ Y ,∫
Ω
V
(
δ∗P (y), θ
)
pθ(y)ρ(θ) =
∫
Ω
V
(
ap(y), θ
)
pθ(y)ρ(θ)
∫
Ω
V
(
δ(y), θ
)
pθ(y)ρ(θ)
The last inequality is an implication of Eqs. (33) and (34). 
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